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Abstract
In this article we propose a compartmental model for the dynamics of Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19). We take into account the presence of asymptomatic infections and the main
policies that have been adopted so far to contain the epidemic: isolation (or social distancing)
of a portion of the population, quarantine for confirmed cases and testing. We model isolation
by separating the population in two groups: one composed by key-workers that keep working
during the pandemic and have a usual contact rate, and a second group consisting of people that
are enforced/recommended to stay at home. We refer to quarantine as strict isolation, and it is
applied to confirmed infected cases.
In the proposed model, the proportion of people in isolation, the level of contact reduction
and the testing rate are control parameters that can vary in time, representing policies that
evolve in different stages. We obtain an explicit expression for the basic reproduction number
R0 in terms of the parameters of the disease and of the control policies. In this way we can
quantify the effect that isolation and testing have in the evolution of the epidemic. We present
a series of simulations to illustrate different realistic scenarios. From the expression of R0 and
the simulations we conclude that isolation (social distancing) and testing among asymptomatic
cases are fundamental actions to control the epidemic, and the stricter these measures are and
the sooner they are implemented, the more lives can be saved. Additionally, we show that people
that remain in isolation significantly reduce their probability of contagion, so risk groups should
be recommended to maintain a low contact rate during the course of the epidemic.
1 Introduction
In late December 2019, several cases of an unknown pneumonia were identified in the city of Wuhan,
Hubei province, China [23]. Some doctors of Wuhan conjectured that it could be severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) cases [24]. Many of the found cases had visited or were related to the
Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market. On 31 December 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO)
China Country Office was informed of these cases of pneumonia detected in Wuhan City and, up to
3 January 2020, a total of 44 patients with this unknown pneumonia were reported to WHO [30].
In the beginning of January 2020 Chinese officials ruled out the hypothesis that the cases were of
SARS [17], and a few days later the cause was identified to be a new coronavirus that was named
SARS-CoV-2. The name given to the infectious disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 is COVID-19.
The first death due to COVID-19 was reported on 9 January and it was a 61-year-old man in
Wuhan [39]. After mid January infected cases were reported in Thailand, Japan, Republic of Korea,
and other provinces in China [23]. On 22 January the Chinese authorities announced the quarantine
of greater Wuhan. From that time on the virus rapidly spread in many Asiatic countries, reached
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Europe and the United States. On 28 February, with more than 80.000 confirmed cases and nearly
3.000 deaths globally, WHO increased the assessment of the risk of spread and risk of impact of
COVID-19 to very high at the global level [26]. On 9 March 2020, with nearly 400 deaths, Italian
government ordered the total lock-down of the national territory [27]. And a few days later, on
March 11, WHO declared that COVID-19 was characterized as a pandemic [28].
In March 2020 several nations across the five continents closed their borders, declared forced
isolation for the whole population except for essential workers and/or imposed strict measures of
social distancing. Detailed information on the actions taken by each country can be found in the
report [14]. At that time WHO recommended, apart from social distancing measures, that it was
essential to test intensively [32]. The indications were to test every suspected case, to isolate till
recovery any positive individual, and to track and test all contacts in the past two days of new
confirmed cases.
The most common symptoms of COVID-19 are fever, cough and shortness of breath. Most of
the cases result in mild or no symptoms, but some progress to viral pneumonia and multi-organ
failure. At this moment, it is estimate that 1 out of 5 cases needs hospitalization [31]. It is yet
difficult to estimate the mortality of this virus. Mortality depends on one side on early detection
and appropriate treatment, but the rate itself can only be calculated if the real number of infected
people is known. There is enough evidence to assure that a significant portion of the infections is
asymptomatic [19, 22, 25], which makes it difficult to detect them and thus to calculate the effective
mortality of COVID-19. WHO, by March 2020, estimated a death rate of 3,4% worldwide [33]. But
in some countries, as Italy, France, Spain and UK, the rate between deaths and confirmed cases up
to May 2020 is higher than 10% [46].
In this article we propose a compartmental model for the dynamics of COVID-19. We take into
account the presence of asymptomatic infections, and also the main policies that have been adopted
by several countries in the past months to fight this disease, these being: isolation, quarantine
and testing. We model isolation by separating the population in two groups: one composed by key-
workers that keep working during the pandemic and having a usual contact rate, and the other group
consisting of people that are enforced/recommended to stay at home. Certainly, in the group of people
that maintain a high contact rate one can also include people that do not respect social distancing
restrictions, that has lately shown to be significant in some countries. We refer to quarantine as
strict isolation, and it is applied to confirmed infected cases. Testing is supposed to be applied
to all symptomatic cases, and to a portion of the population selected using some of the criteria
adopted by health organizations (see e.g. [9, 11]). The idea to analyze the quantitative effects of
non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as isolation and social distancing, on the evolution of the
epidemic was inspired by the work [10].
For the proposed model, we obtain an expression for the basic reproduction numberR0 in terms of
the parameters of the disease and of the control parameters. In this way we can quantify the effects
that isolation and testing have on the epidemic. We exhibit a series of simulations to illustrate
different realistic situations. We compare, in particular, different levels of isolation and testing.
From the expression of R0 and the simulations, we conclude that isolation (social distancing) and
testing among asymptomatic cases are fundamental actions to control the epidemic, and the stricter
these measures are and the sooner they are implemented, the more lives can be saved. Additionally,
we show that people that remain in isolation significantly reduce their probability of contagion, so
risk groups should be recommended to maintain a low contact rate during the course of the epidemic.
Several mathematical models for COVID-19 have appeared recently in the literature. At the time
being, the flux of publications is very high, so it is difficult to keep track of everything that is being
published. We next mention and describe some of the models more closely related to ours. In [3]
they consider a simple model, with infected and reported infected compartments, and they assume
that the transmission rate β is a function of a control u, this is β = β(u). They analyze feedback
control strategies, where the control depends on the number of reported cases. In [8] they consider
mild and severe cases, the latter having a reduced transmission rate since they are assumed to be in
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isolation. They use a time-dependent control c of reduction of contacts for the whole population, and
optimize with respect to this control. An SEIR model with quarantine for suspected and infected
cases cases is considered in [37], and in [21] they take into account unreported cases, asymptomatic
individuals and quarantine for identified cases.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model, and we discuss its
structure. In Section 3 we show an expression of the basic reproduction number R0 in terms of
the parameters and we propose an equivalent threshold. Estimation of realistic parameters and
numerical simulations are given in Section 4, while Section 5 is devoted to the conclusions and
a description of possible continuations of this research. Finally, in the Appendix we include the
analytical computations of the expression of R0 and a sensitivity analysis with respect to the involved
parameters.
2 The model description
We set up a model to describe the spread of the virus SARS-CoV-2 through a susceptible population.
Building upon a usual SEIR model, we obtain a more structured one, which is tailored on the
current experience of the COVID-19 epidemic, and which also allows to convey the effects of the
non-pharmaceutical intervention policies being adopted by several countries to face its outbreak.
First of all, we normalize to 1 the total population of N individuals, so that all the compartments
(and their sub-compartments) introduced below represent the proportion of individuals of the total
population in such compartment. We will assume the population remains constant over time (i.e., we
neglect the natural birth and death rates). We start by splitting the population in the compartments
listed in Table 1.
Compartment Description
S susceptible
E exposed
I infectious
A asymptomatic and infectious
Q infected in quarantine (including hospitalized)
R recovered
Table 1: List of aggregated compartments
More specifically, the compartment S collects all the individuals that are susceptible to the virus.
Once an individual from S gets exposed to the virus, moves to the compartment E. Let us point
out that individuals in E, though already exposed to the virus, are not contagious yet. After a given
latent time, an individual in E becomes infectious, and thus is allocated to the compartment I. At
this stage, after a suitable time, the individual may either remain infectious but asymptomatic (or
with mild symptoms), in which case moves to the compartment A, or may show clear symptoms
onset, thus being tested and then quarantined either at home or at the hospital, and being assigned
to the compartment Q. Finally, individuals in A and Q will eventually be removed from those
compartments and will end up either in the compartment R after a recovery time or dead.
We will assume that the fraction of asymptomatic individuals among all infected is given by a
certain probability α ∈ (0, 1). It is intuitive that the presence of a relevant portion of asymptomatic
infectious individuals plays a major role in the spread of the epidemic, as observed in the current
outbreak [22, 25]. Indeed, an asymptomatic individual will maintain a high contact rate, and thus
might infect more susceptible individuals with respect to an infectious individual with symptoms
that is in quarantine. In our model, we always refer to the effective contact rate β, which is given
by the product between the transmissibility ν (i.e., probability of infection given contact between
a susceptible and infected individual), and the average rate of contact c between susceptible and
infected individuals. In Tables 2 and 3 we list all the parameters of the model and their description.
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The model as described so far takes into account several characteristics of the pathogen and its
spread in a susceptible population. We now want to add further structural features to the model
in order to include the non-pharmaceutical interventions adopted by public policies to contain the
epidemic. In particular, we assume the following conditions.
i) A part p of the population is in isolation (either voluntarily, or as a result of public safety
policies). The remaining 1−p of the population instead gathers all those so-called “key workers”
(such as physicians and paramedicals, workers in logistics and distribution, food production,
security, and others), that must continue with a regular activity, thus maintaining a large
contact rate and being exposed to a higher risk of infection. We will generically refer to such 1−p
part of population as the active population, as opposed to the population in isolation. In this
group we can also include people that simply do not respect social distancing, and thus maintain
a high contact rate. A situation like this has been observed in countries were monitoring was
not strict and a significant percentage of the population did not respect isolation.
ii) The fraction 1 − p of active population has an effective contact rate β, whereas the p part of
population in isolation has a contact rate reduced by a factor r, thus its compound contact
rate is rβ. We will therefore refer to such portion of the population as in r-isolation.
iii) A centralized controller (such as the national health system) may intervene on the system by
testing a portion of the population to check for the infectious pathogen. We assume the testing
kit to be reliable, that is, we neglect the possibility of false positive/negative. As a rule, then, an
individual from the compartment S will always test negative, an individual from I or A always
positive, while an individual from E will result positive with a probability δ ∈ [0, 1]. In this
way, even though the individuals in E are not contagious, we account for the possibility that
they might result positive to the test, depending on the stage of development of the pathogen
in that specific individual and to the efficacy of the testing kit.
Let us notice that, in general, the effective contact rate β depends on a variety of factors, including
the density of population in a given country/region. However, during a pandemic, even the effective
contact rate of the individuals not in isolation may be reduced by increased awareness (for example,
maintaining the social distancing), or by respecting stricter safety protocols and by availability of
proper Personal Protection Equipment (PPE), including face shields, masks, gloves, soap, and so on.
According to the above description, each compartment S, E, I and A is partitioned as follows:
S = Sf ∪ Sr, where Sf are susceptible and active, while Sr are susceptible and in r-isolation;
E = Ef ∪Er, where Ef are exposed and active, while Er are exposed and in r-isolation; I = If ∪ Ir,
where If are infectious and active, Ir are infectious and in r-isolation; A = Af ∪ Ar, where Af
are asymptomatic infectious and active, Ar are asymptomatic infectious and in r-isolation. The
compartment Q collects all the infected individuals who have been tested positive, either after onset
of severe symptoms, or because of a sample test among the population, according to the procedure
described in iii) of the above list. Let us stress that, among these compartments, only the individuals
in Q are aware of being infected, and thus contagious, hence they are either hospitalized or at home,
but in both cases they follow strict procedures to reduce their contact rate to 0. Finally, we will
use the compartments R for the recovered and immune individuals, and D for the disease-induced
deaths. Both these last compartments will be removed from the dynamics and will end up in the
counter system (2). Moreover, we point out that the portion p of the population in r-isolation is
predetermined at the initial time of the evolution, reflecting the public policy in place in that specific
period of time. Of course, such fraction p may be updated at a later time, accordingly to newer
(stricter or looser) public policies.
The first set of constants, related to the pathogen itself (assuming no mutation occurs in the time
of epidemic, or if so, the mutation does not affect such parameters of the virus) and its induced disease,
are collected in Table 2. A graphical representation of the course of the disease for symptomatic
carriers can be seen in Figure 1.
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Par. Description
τ inverse of the latent time from exposure to infectiousness onset
σ inverse of the time from infectiousness onset to possible symptoms onset
θ inverse of mean incubation time (i.e. θ−1 = τ−1 + σ−1)
α proportion of asymptomatic infections
γ1 recovery rate for asymptomatic or mild symptomatic cases
γ2 recovery rate for severe and critical cases
µ mortality rate among confirmed cases
δ probability of detection by testing in compartment E
Table 2: Parameters of COVID-19
exposure infectiousness
onset
symptoms
onset
recovery
τ−1 σ−1 γ
−1
2
incubation period: θ−1
death
Figure 1: Disease timeline for symptomatic cases
The second set of parameters is related to public policies, and consists of the parameters in
Table 3. Let us recall at this point that β varies in each territory, depending mainly on population
density and behaviour. These constants may be used as control parameters, via the tuned lockdown
as decided by the public policies (reflecting on p and partially on r), the awareness of the population
in respecting the social distancing among individuals and in the widespread use of personal protection
equipment (expressed by β and partially by r), the availability of testing kits, that results in a higher
or lower value of ρ.
Par. Description
β(t) transmission rate at time t (proportional to contact rate)
r(t) reduction coefficient of transmission rate
for people in isolation at time t
ρ(t) testing rate of people with mild or no symptoms at time t
p(t) proportion of the population in r-isolation
Table 3: Parameters of Public Policies interventions
The extended state variable of the system thus becomes
X˜ = (Ef , Er, If , Ir, Af , Ar, Q, Sf , Sr, R,D) ,
where the description of the compartments is given in Table 4.
We focus in particular on the evolution of the variable
X = (Ef , Er, If , Ir, Af , Ar, Q, Sf , Sr) ,
5
Compartment Description
Ef exposed, not in isolation, not contagious
Er exposed, in r-isolation, not contagious
If infected and contagious, not in isolation
Ir infected and contagious, in r-isolation
Af asymptomatic and contagious, not in isolation
Ar asymptomatic and contagious, in r-isolation
Q infected and tested positive, in enforced quarantine
Sf susceptible not in isolation
Sr susceptible in r-isolation
R recovered and immune
D dead
Table 4: List of extended compartments
that follows the model
E˙f = β(t)Sf [If +Af + r(t)(Ir +Ar)]− ρ(t)δEf − τEf
E˙r = r(t)β(t)Sr [If +Af + r(t)(Ir +Ar)]− ρ(t)δEr − τEr
I˙f = τEf − σIf − ρ(t)If
I˙r = τEr − σIr − ρ(t)Ir
A˙f = σαIf − ρ(t)Af − γ1Af
A˙r = σαIr − ρ(t)Ar − γ1Ar
Q˙ = σ(1− α)(If + Ir) + ρ(t)
[
δ(Ef + Er) + If + Ir +Af +Ar
]− γ2Q− µQ
S˙f = −β(t)Sf [If +Af + r(t)(Ir +Ar)]
S˙r = −r(t)β(t)Sr[If +Af + r(t)(Ir +Ar)]
(1)
while the evolution of the states
R˙ = γ1(Af +Ar) + γ2Q
D˙ = µQ
(2)
only provides counters for the proportion (over the total population) of recovered and dead individ-
uals, respectively. See the compartmental diagram associated to this model in Figure 2.
Sf
Sr
Ef
Er
If
Ir
Af
Ar
Q
D
R
1−
p
p
β τ
ασ
(1 − α)σ
γ1
γ2
βr τ
ασ
(1 − α
)σ µ
δρ
δρ
ρ
ρ
γ 1
Figure 2: Model diagram
6
Remark 2.1 (About the testing rate ρ) The parameter ρ indicates the proportion of the popu-
lation presenting either mild or no symptoms that is tested daily. It can also be thought as the inverse
of the mean duration that an infected person passes without being tested. For instance, if the system
manages to detect, each day, 5% of the asymptomatic infections, then ρ = 0.05. If we are in an ideal
“trace and test” situation (see e.g. South Korea [13]), in which for each confirmed infection, his/her
recent contacts are rapidly and efficiently traced and tested, then ρ will be greater and this will have
an impact in the basic reproduction number (see Section 3).
Recalling that testing is supposed to be applied, at least, to all sufficiently symptomatic cases,
we add a counter for the positive tests T (t) until time t, which evolves according to the equation
T˙ = σ(1− α)(If + Ir) + ρ(t)
(
δ(Ef + Er) + If + Ir +Af +Ar
)
.
Having this quantity, one can estimate the total number of tests in each territory using the testing
positive rate of that location, which is the ratio between reported cases and tests done [29, 45].
Remark 2.2 (About symptoms and quarantine) In our framework, we assume that all cases
with sufficiently severe symptoms are (tested and) quarantined, and we set the parameter α ∈ (0, 1)
to be the fraction of asymptomatic cases, including the cases with mild symptoms. But we can adapt
our model to a scenario in which even severe symptoms are not tested until critical. In this case,
with a very large value for α, only a small portion among the symptomatic individuals enters directly
to Q, while the others need to be tested (according to the sampling testing ρ among the population)
to be quarantined.
System (1) is endowed with the set of initial conditions given by the vector
X0 = (Ef,0, Er,0, If,0, Ir,0, Af,0, Ar,0, Q0, Sf,0, Sr,0) (3)
with components in the interval [0, 1]. Setting
C1 :=
{
X = (xi)i=1,...,9 ∈ R9 : xi ∈ [0, 1], for i = 1, . . . 9
}
,
the cube of states with entries between 0 and 1, it is easy to check that C1 is invariant under the flow
of system (1), that is, given an initial condition X0 ∈ C1, the solution X(t) to (1)-(3) remains in C1
for all t > 0.
Remark 2.3 (Possible extensions of the model) We collect here some variations of model (1)
that can be formulated in the same framework considered in this paper.
1. One might consider a small but not negligible contact rate between susceptible individuals and
people in the compartment Q, accounting for infections (mainly of medicals and paramedicals)
occurred during hospitalization of an infected individual, or for individuals tested positive in
enforced quarantine at home, which do not comply strictly to the isolation procedures and end
up infecting relatives or other contacts. In this case, the equations for the evolution of the
susceptible compartments shall be completed with additional terms involving ε in the following
way:
S˙f = −β(t)Sf [If +Af + r(t)(Ir +Ar) + εQ] ,
S˙r = −r(t)β(t)Sr[If +Af + r(t)(Ir +Ar) + εQ] ,
and the same terms with opposite sign shall appear in the equation corresponding to Q˙.
2. At the current stage, it is still not clear how long the immunity of a recovered individual lasts,
with a number of findings tending towards a rather long immunization period [1, 38, 41]. For
this reason, in (1) we assume that a recovered individual will remain immune over the time
framework considered in the different scenarios. However, the model can easily describe the case
of recovered individuals becoming susceptible again, by adding a transfer term from the compart-
ment R to Sf and Sr, with a coefficient depending on the inverse of the average immunization
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period. Similarly, the model can include the case of reactivation of the virus in an individual
previously declared recovered (and not newly exposed to the virus), by inserting a transfer term
from the compartment R into If and Ir, with appropriate coefficients depending on the prob-
ability of the reactivation of the virus and on the inverse of the average time of reactivation.
However, at the moment there are not strong evidences supporting such possibility [38].
3. A crucial issue while coping with the outbreak of the epidemic, which leads to the so-called urge
of flattening the curve, is whether the number of critical cases in need of intensive care (IC)
treatment (due to respiratory failure, shock, and multiple organ dysfunction or failure) would
saturate the number of available intensive care units (ICUs).
This parameter can be estimated directly from model (1), considering for each country the
number of available ICUs and the percentage of positive confirmed cases requiring IC treatment.
For example, this percentage has been estimated to be about 6% for China [4], and up to 12%
for Italy [12, 35]. As an alternative, it would be possible to insert a further compartment C
in model (1) counting the number of the individuals needing ICU treatment, by modifying the
equations corresponding to the compartments Q and D as follows:
Q˙ = σ(1− α)I + ρ(t)[δE + I +A]− γ2Q − τcQ
C˙ = τcQ − µcC − γcC
D˙ = µcC
with suitable coefficients τc, µc and γc denoting the inverse of the time from symptoms onset
to critical symptoms, the mortality of critical cases, and the recovery rate for critical cases,
respectively.
4. In this paper we have considered the whole population as a fixed number of individuals during
the time period of the evolution. It is of course possible to consider the case of an evolving
total population, by including in the model (1) the natural birth and mortality rate. In particu-
lar, newborns of susceptible individuals shall enter the corresponding susceptible compartment,
whereas it is not clear whether the offspring of an infectious individual would be infectious, in
such case the newborn shall move directly to the compartment I. On the other hand, the natural
mortality rate shall act on each compartment of system (1), as well as on R in system (2).
3 The basic reproduction number for model (1)
We are interested in determining the basic reproduction number R0 associated with system (1). To
do this, we assume to fix a time interval [t0, t1] such that the coefficients β(t), r(t) and ρ(t) are
constant over [t0, t1]. This is coherent with the setting of the scenarios simulated in Section 4.2,
where we assume such coefficients to be piecewise constant functions, sharing the same switching
times, that represent different phases of restrictions and policies. Thus, according to the calculations
given in the Appendix A.1 and the parameters in Tables 2 and 3, we obtain that the value of R0 for
each time interval between two consecutive switching times is given by
R0 = 1
2
(
ϕ+
√
ϕ2 +
4σα
ρ+ γ1
ϕ
)
, (4)
with
ϕ =
βτ(1− (1− r2)p)
(ρδ + τ)(σ + ρ)
. (5)
From this explicit formula for the reproduction number R0, we can highlight the qualitative depen-
dence of R0 on each parameter of the system, in particular:
- If the effective contact rate β increases, then R0 increases.
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- Focusing on the coefficient 1− (1− r2)p, we realize that closer is p to 1, and smaller is r, that
is, as larger is the portion of population in r-isolation and as stricter is the reduction factor r
in its contact rate, lower R0 becomes.
- If α increases, that is, if there is a larger proportion of asymptomatic infectious individuals,
then R0 increases.
- If σ increases, corresponding to shorter onset time, then R0 decreases.
- If either ρ or γ1 increase, i.e., either the control action by testing is strengthened, for example
through an improved tracing and tracking system, or the recovery rate improves, for example,
because of new and more effective treatments, then R0 decreases.
- If δ increases, for example, as a result of improved testing kits able to detect the infection at
an earlier stage, then R0 decreases.
Moreover, we can characterize the crucial condition R0 ≤ 1 by means of a simpler expression than (4),
as described in the next result.
Proposition 3.1 (Alternative threshold) Set
T0 := βτ [1− (1− r
2)p]
(ρδ + τ)(σ + ρ)
(
1 +
σα
ρ+ γ1
)
.
Then R0 is smaller than (respectively, equal to or greater than) 1 if and only if the same relation
holds for T0. In particular, if ϕ > 1 (see (5)), then R0 > 1 and T0 > 1.
We postpone the proof of Proposition 3.1 to the Appendix A.2. A more quantitative analysis of
the dependence of the threshold T0 on the parameters of the model is developed in the Appendix A.3.
Remark 3.2 (About no testing among asymptomatic carriers) If we consider the case of ρ =
0, that is, the situation without sample testing among the asymptomatic population, then the basic
reproduction number R0 is independent of the latent time τ . In particular, T0 becomes
β[1− (1− r2)p]
σ
(
1 +
σα
γ1
)
.
Remark 3.3 (On the time-dependent reproduction number) Relation (4) gives an expres-
sion of R0, that is the reproduction number in a totally susceptible population. As the epidemic
evolves, a portion of the population becomes immune to the disease, and this makes the reproduction
number decrease. More precisely, when p = 0 and all the population has the same contact rate, the
time-dependent reproduction number is given by R(t) = S(t)R0, where S(t) is the susceptible portion
of the population. In our model, since the groups of active individuals and in r-isolation evolve dif-
ferently (see Scenario A4 and Figure 4 below), the time-dependent reproduction number R(t) is given
by the formula (4) where ϕ in (5) is
βτ [Sf (t) + r
2Sr(t)]
(ρδ + τ)(σ + ρ)
.
We do not take into account this time-variation of the reproduction number in our numerical results,
since we are only interested in the value of the reproduction number at the beginning of each phase,
where S(t) is close to 1.
Remark 3.4 (On herd immunity) Herd immunity is defined as the proportion of the population
that needs to be immunized in order to naturally slow down the spread of the disease. It depends on
the value of the basic reproduction number in the following way: herd immunity level equals 1− 1R0 .
So the bigger R0, the higher the herd immunity. In connection with above Remark 3.3, we highlight
that herd immunity is achieved at the time t when R(t) equals 1.
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4 Numerical simulations
4.1 Retrieving parameters
In Table 5 we collect some parameter values estimated in the literature, in order to do realistic
simulations. Recall the description of the parameters given in Tables 2-3.
Par. Value - Range Reference Remark
β 0.7676 [36] 1
τ−1 τ−1 = θ−1 − σ−1 [20] 2
σ−1 1 - 3 days [34, 48, 49] 4
θ−1 5.1 - 6.4 days [2, 18, 20] 5
γ1 7.5 - 12 days [4, 16] 6
γ2 15 - 22 days [4, 49] 7
µ [0.03/14,0.1/14] [33, 42] 8
α [0.265,0.643] [5, 19] 3
p [0, 1] [14] 9
r [0, 1] [14] 9
ρ [0,0.5] [45] 10
δ 1 [15] 11
Table 5: Realistic range of parameters values
Several remarks regarding the parameter values in Table 5 follow.
1. The parameter β strongly depends on the population behaviour. We take the value of β from [36], where they
calibrated an SEIR model with isolation and estimated the transmission rate β, before lockdown, to be 0.7676
(with a 95% confidence interval (0.7403, 0.7949)).
2. The mean duration of the latent period can be computed using the estimates for the incubation period (i.e. from
exposure to symptom onset) and the time from infectiousness onset to symptom onset, so it is reasonable to
take τ−1 between 2 and 4 days. More precisely, in [20] they fitted an SEIQR model to the data from Wuhan
and estimated a latent period of duration 2.92 days with a 95% CI of (1.09, 5.28).
3. In [5] they show the testing results on Diamond Princess passengers, a cruise ship that was quarantined in
February-March 2020, at the beginning of the epidemic. Almost all passengers and crew members were tested,
resulting in 410 asymptomatic infections among 696 positive-tested persons, which yields an asymptotic rate
of 0.589. In [19], they studied the infection in the municipality of Vo’, Italy. They estimated a median of
asymptomatic cases of 44.8%. with a 95% CI of (26.5,64.3). Other estimates were given in [6, 22, 25].
4. In [49], they measured time from infectiousness onset to appearance of symptoms. It resulted in approximate 1
day for fever and 1-3 days for cough. Furthermore, it has been observed in clinical cases studied in [43] that the
contagious period may start before the appearance of symptoms, and outlast the symptoms end.
5. The reference [2] estimates θ to be 6.4 based on travellers returning from Wuhan. In [18] it was estimated to be
5.1 days. Other estimates were given in [20].
6. The estimate of γ1 is difficult, since for asymptomatic cases is hard to observe and track the time from exposure
to recovery. [16] estimated 9.5 days for asymptomatic cases, while [4] estimated 14 days for mild cases. So it
is reasonable to assume γ1 in the range 7.5 - 12, considering around 2 days between infectiousness onset and
symptoms onset.
7. In [49] they measured viral shedding duration, and estimated a median of 20 days, with an interquartile range
of (17, 24). Removing the approximately 2-day period from infectiousness onset to symptoms onset, we get an
IQR for γ−12 of (15, 22). These values approximate the duration of quarantine recommended to positive-tested
cases.
8. The rate µ depends on the percentage of infections that have been detected, since it is proportional to the ratio
between confirmed cases and deaths. WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing of 3 March
2020 [33] announced an estimated global death rate of 3.4%. In some countries, like Italy, the ratio between
deaths and confirmed cases up to May 2020 is larger that 0.1, while in others, like Israel, it is around 0.01.
Regarding the time a person takes to die from COVID-19, in [49] they estimated 18.5 days from infectiousness
onset to death.
9. The values of p and r vary in each country/territory depending on the public policies and the population’s
compliance to these measures. A detailed and real-time survey on the percentage of people under lockdown in
each country can be found in [14].
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10. As already mentioned in Remark 2.1, ρ represents the proportion of the infected asymptomatic population that
is tested daily. In a realistic scenario, it would not be reasonable to set a too high value of ρ, let us say, over 0.5,
because it would account for detecting more than 50% of the infected asymptomatic population daily.
11. It is not yet know “at what point during the course of illness a test becomes positive” (see [15]). For the
simulations we set δ to 1 and suppose that the tests detect the infection from exposure.
4.2 Simulations for different scenarios
In this subsection we consider several scenarios and show their outcomes. Many of the graphics are
in logarithmic scale, given that the values represent portions of the population, and then can assume
very small values.
4.2.1 Scenarios A
We consider the four different scenarios with the following characteristics:
Scenario A1: no isolation, no testing among asymptomatic people
Scenario A2: 20%-isolation of 60% of the population from day 31, no testing among asymptomatic
people
Scenario A3: 20%-isolation of 90% of the population from day 31, no testing among asymptomatic
people
Scenario A4: 20%-isolation of 90% of the population from day 31, intensive testing among asymp-
tomatic people
These Scenarios A can be seen as: no action, mild lockdown, strict lockdown and strict lockdown
with testing among asymptomatic suspected cases. As initial condition we take, in all the scenarios,
one exposed case per million inhabitant, this is:
Ef (0) + Er(0) = 1× 10−6, Sf (0) + Sr(0) = 1− 1× 10−6.
The remainder of the compartments start with value 0. Results and parameters for Scenario A
are given in Table 6 and graphics in Figure 3. We can observe the effect of the lockdown on the
epidemic. The mild lockdown of A2 reduces more than half of the infections w.r.t. the no action
situation A1, while the strict lockdowns A3 and A4 induce a reduction of the order of 10
−2 in total
recovered, deaths and positive tests. In particular, comparing A3 and A4 we can see that testing and
consequent quarantine for positive-tested asymptomatic cases not only reduces the infections and
deaths more than 66%, but also the duration of the epidemic.
Remark 4.1 (About Scenario A2) United States had 15 confirmed infections by February 15th
2020 [44]. Many states started their lockdown between March 15th and March 20th, which put around
60% of the population in isolation [14]. We can assume that day 0 is February 15th, then day 31
would be in the middle point of the interval when lockdowns started. Day 80 (May 6th) US had 72,287
confirmed deaths, while in Scenario A2 gives 91,231, that is larger but not far. Scenario A2 could be
a good approximation of the situation in the US until the beginning of May 2020, and the excess in
the computed deaths in comparison to real data suggests that deaths could be underreported by 26%,
which is coherent with some recent studies on underreported deaths (see e.g. [47]).
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Figure 3: Scenarios A1, A2, A3 and A4.
Par. A1 A2 A3 A4
β 0.7676
p 0
0 if t ≤ 31
0.6 if t > 31
0 if t ≤ 31
0.9 if t > 31
r 1
1 if t ≤ 31
0.2 if t > 31
ρ 0 0.05
δ 1
τ 1/3.2
σ 1/2
θ 1/5.2
γ1 1/8
γ2 1/16
µ 0.058/14
α 0.4
R0 2.51 2.51 if t ≤ 311.4 if t > 31
2.51 if t ≤ 31
0.69 if t > 31
1.92 if t ≤ 31
0.52 of t > 31
peak day
(for Q)
76 146 40 38
recovered 9.43 × 10−1 4.01× 10−1 1.29 × 10−3 2.77× 10−4
deaths 3.66 × 10−2 1.56× 10−2 5.02 × 10−5 1.41× 10−5
positive tests 5.88 × 10−1 2.5 × 10−1 8.06 × 10−4 2.26× 10−4
ending day
(Q ≤ 10−9) 377 >500 314 225
Table 6: Scenarios A1, A2, A3 and A4. Parameters and epidemics output
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For Scenario A4 we make a comparison of infections for the two groups: the active one (that
continues with the usual contact rate) and the one in r-isolation. By comparing the infections’
curves and the cumulative infections, we can give an estimate on the lower chance that people in
r-isolation have to get exposed. In this particular scenario, people that are not in isolation have
nearly 6 times more chance to be infected. See the graphs in Figure 3, were we show the curves of
infections and cumulative infections for each group, normalized by the proportions 1− p, p.
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Figure 4: Comparison of infections for population in and out isolation
4.2.2 Scenarios B: different restriction level of lockdown
We next consider the following four scenarios in which we vary the values of the portion p of people
under lockdown and their level r of restriction of social contacts.
Scenario B1: 50%-isolation of 50% of the population from day 35
Scenario B2: 40%-isolation of 65% of the population from day 35
Scenario B3: 30%-isolation of 80% of the population from day 35
Scenario B4: 20%-isolation of 90% of the population from day 35
We measure the outcomes. The parameters and results are given in Table 7, and graphics in Figure 5.
The parameters that are not specified in Table 7, are repeated from Table 6. For these four scenarios
we consider the same testing rate ρ among asymptomatic cases.
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Par. B1 B2 B3 B4
β 0.7676
µ 0.034/14
p
0 if t ≤ 35
0.5 if t > 35
0 if t ≤ 35
0.65 if t > 35
0 if t ≤ 35
0.8 if t > 35
0 if t ≤ 35
0.9 if t > 35
r
1 if t ≤ 35
0.5 if t > 35
1 if t ≤ 35
0.4 if t > 35
1 if t ≤ 35
0.3 if t > 35
1 if t ≤ 35
0.2 if t > 35
ρ 0.02
R0 2.24 if t ≤ 351.61 if t > 35
2.24 if t ≤ 35
1.23 if t > 35
2.24 if t ≤ 35
0.93 of t > 35
2.24 if t ≤ 35
0.61 of t > 35
peak day 113 159 51 43
recovered 7.16 × 10−1 4.36 × 10−1 5.78 × 10−3 1.45 × 10−3
deaths 1.89 × 10−2 1.15 × 10−2 1.53 × 10−4 3.96 × 10−5
positive tests 5.06 × 10−1 3.08 × 10−1 4.09 × 10−3 1.06 × 10−3
ending day 436 > 500 > 500 274
Table 7: Scenarios B1, B2, B3 and B4. Parameters and epidemic outputs
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Figure 5: Scenarios B1, B2, B3 and B4
Scenarios B1 and B2 show cases in which the restrictions are not strong enough. Indeed, in both
cases the basic reproduction number R0 remains above 1 also after the lockdown intervention (see
Table 7), and the infection reaches 71.6% and 43.6% of the population, causing the death of 1.89%
and 1.15% of the population, respectively, which is a catastrophic outcome. Comparing these four
scenarios, we shall deduce that, in order to be effective in containing the outbreak, the lockdown shall
address at least 80% of the population reducing their contact rate to about 30% of their usual contacts.
Indeed, in the scenario B3, the basic reproduction number becomes 0.93 after day 35, meaning that
loosening the restrictions of this scenario (while keeping all other parameters unchanged) might turn
the R0 above 1.
4.2.3 Scenarios C: early vs. late lockdown
We now compare two situations, one in which lockdown starts immediately, just 21 days after the
first confirmed cases, and the other for which lockdown starts four weeks later. More precisely, we
consider the following two scenarios and measure the different outputs:
Scenario C1: 20%-isolation of 90% of the population from day 21
Scenario C2: 20%-isolation of 90% of the population from day 49
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Par. C1 C2
β 0.7676
µ 0.058/14
p
0 if t ≤ 21
0.9 if t > 21
0 if t ≤ 49
0.9 if t > 49
r
1 if t ≤ 21
0.2 if t > 21
1 if t ≤ 49
0.2 if t > 49
ρ 0.02
R0 2.24 if t ≤ 210.61 if t > 21
2.24 if t ≤ 49
0.61 if t > 50
peak day 29 57
recovered 9.17 × 10−5 2.27 × 10−2
deaths 4.2× 10−6 1.02 × 10−3
positive tests 6.67 × 10−5 1.63 × 10−2
ending day 213 323
Table 8: Scenarios C1 and C2: early lockdown vs. late lockdown. Parameters and epidemic outputs
The parameters and outputs are given in Table 8 and Figure 6. It is evident the impact of delaying
the beginning of lockdown on the final outcome: the numbers of recovered and deaths in the Scenario
C2 are of the order of 10
3 times those of the Scenario C1. As an example, from Table 8 one notice
that, at the end of the epidemic, the Scenario C1 counts 4.2 deaths per million inhabitants, while the
Scenario C2 faces 1020 deaths per million. Moreover, the epidemic in Scenario C2 lasts about 110
days more than in Scenario C1, thus also undergoes worst economic consequences of the lockdown.
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Figure 6: Scenarios C1 and C2.
4.2.4 Scenarios D: early testing vs. late testing
We now want to asses the impact of testing timing. For this, we consider the following two scenarios
and measure the different outputs:
Scenario D1: 20%-isolation of 80% of the population from day 50, efficient testing before day 50,
reduced testing after
Scenario D2: 20%-isolation of 80% of the population from day 50, few testing before day 50, massive
testing after
The parameter values and outcomes of the epidemic in Scenarios D1 and D2 are given in Table 9 and
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figures in Figure 7. It can be seen the cost in infection and lives it has to start testing late. It is worth
noticing that, in spite of a higher total number of tests carried out in the Scenario D2, the strategy
adopted in the Scenario D1 attains a considerably better outcome: indeed, the infections and deaths
of Scenario D2 are of the order of 10
2 w.r.t. the ones in Scenario D1, and the only difference was
doing efficient testing at the beginning of the epidemic.
Par. D1 D2
β 0.7676
µ 0.034/14
p
0 if t ≤ 50
0.8 if t > 50
r
1 if t ≤ 50
0.2 if t > 50
ρ
0.1 if t ≤ 50
0.05 if t > 50
0.01 if t ≤ 50
0.1 if t > 50
R0 1.53 if t ≤ 500.9 if t > 50
2.37 if t ≤ 50
0.57 if t > 50
peak day 56 58
recovered 9.04 × 10−4 4.29 × 10−2
deaths 2.83 × 10−5 1.35 × 10−3
positive tests 7.58 × 10−4 3.6× 10−2
ending day 302 327
Table 9: Scenarios D1 and D2: early efficient testing vs. late massive testing. Parameters and
epidemic outputs
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Figure 7: Scenarios D1 and D2.
4.3 Scenarios E: different testing rates
Now we fix the parameters β, µ, p, r as in Table 9 and we vary only ρ to take the four different
values 0, 0.02, 0.05 and 0.1 over the whole time period. We get the outcome of Figure 8. From the
comparison among these four scenarios, we realize that a high value of ρ, as the result of an efficient
tracing and testing strategy, may reduce the number of cumulative infected individuals and deaths
of an order of 102.
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Figure 8: Scenarios E1, E2, E3 and E4
The simulations were done with Python and all the codes are in the GitHub repository
github.com/lucasmoschen/covid-19-model.
5 Conclusions
In the paper we present an SEIR model with Asymptomatic and Quarantined compartments to de-
scribe the recent and ongoing COVID-19 outbreak. Our model is intended to highlight the strength
of three different non-pharmaceutical interventions imposed by public policies in containing the out-
break and the total number of disease-induced infections and deaths:
- reduction of contact rate for a given portion of the population;
- enforced quarantine for confirmed infectious individuals;
- testing among the population to detect also asymptomatic infectious individuals.
On one hand we show that, as expected, each of these interventions has a beneficial impact on
flattening the curve of the outbreak. On the other hand, the comparison among different scenarios
shows the remarkable efficacy of an early massive testing approach, when the limited number of
infected individuals makes easier and more effective the tracing of recent contacts of the individual,
as in Scenario D1, and of a timely lockdown, although in the presence of few confirmed infected
cases, as in Scenario C1. In both situations, the timing of the intervention plays a crucial role on the
incisiveness of the public safety policy.
In addition, we give an explicit representation of the basic reproduction number in terms of the
several parameters of the model, which allows to describe its dependence on the features of the virus
and on the implemented non-pharmaceutical interventions.
This description makes available a valuable tool to tune the public policies in order to control the
outbreak of the epidemic, forcing R0 below the threshold 1. However, considering the major effects
of an enduring lockdown on the economy of the country that applies it, it is desirable to loosen
the lockdown measures after the containment of the outbreak. Nevertheless, the decision makers
and each individual shall be aware that a value of R0 only barely greater than 1 would lead to an
increase in the number of infected and dead by an order 2 of magnitude, thus provoking the collapse
of the relative national health system. This is better explained by the following scenarios: consider
a situation with constant testing ρ = 0.05 and no lockdown where, after the first 35 days of outbreak
with a high R0 (≈ 2), the population gains awareness of the risk and manage to reduce its contact
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Figure 9: The impact of small variations on R0
rate so as to steer R0 to either 0.9, 1 or 1.1. Figure 9 illustrates the large deviations among the
outcome of these three different situations.
In order to allow the population to circulate with no restrictions, it is necessary that herd immu-
nity (see Remark 3.4) is achieved. The value that matters to compute this threshold of immunization
is the basic reproduction number under no social distancing, which has been estimated in this article
and in many others as being, in general, greater than 2.5. So achieving herd immunity would imply
to infect at least 60% of the population, which would lead, with the current mortality rates, to 1-5%
of the population dying, which is, obviously, a catastrophic unwanted situation. Hence, reinforcing
what was said in the above paragraph, until a vaccine or treatment is not found, it is necessary to
maintain the value of R0 below 1. Otherwise, the curve of infections will always be increasing.
A Appendix
A.1 Computing R0
Recalling the model (1), we are able to give an analytic expression of the basic reproduction number
R0 associated to the system.
In order to do so, we assume to fix a time interval [t0, t1] such that the coefficients β(t), r(t) and
ρ(t) are constant over [t0, t1]. This is coherent with the setting of the Section 4, where we assume
such coefficients to be piecewise constant functions, sharing the same switching times. Thus, the
following procedure allows to evaluate the value of R0 for each time interval between two consecutive
switching times.
It is well known that the reproduction number R0 is the crucial parameter to establish whether
Disease Free Equilibria (DFE) are stable or not [7, 40]. We denote by Xs the set of DFE, which is
given by
Xs = {X ∈ C1 : Ef = Er = If = Ir = Af = Ar = Q = 0} .
We can recast system (1) in the compact form
X˙(t) = f(X(t)) (6)
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by introducing
f(X) =


βSf [If+Af+r(Ir+Ar)]−ρδEf−τEf
rβSr[If+Af+r(Ir+Ar)]−ρδEr−τEr
τEf−σIf−ρIf
τEr−σIr−ρIr
σαIf−ρAf−γ1Af
σαIr−ρAr−γ1Ar
σ(1−α)[If+Ir]+ρ
(
δ(Ef+Er)+If+Ir+Af+Ar
)
−γ2Q−µQ
−βSf [If+Af+r(Ir+Ar)]
−rβSr[If+Af+r(Ir+Ar)]


.
The stability of (6) around a DFE X∗ is related to the spectral properties of the linearized system
around X∗, whose dynamics is ruled by the Jacobian Df = (∂fi/∂xj)i,j=1,...,9 of f . However, the
high dimensionality of Df(X) makes it difficult to develop an analytical analysis of its spectrum and
its stability properties. We will therefore follow a different approach, deducing the value of R0 from
the result in [40], which ensures that R0 is given by the formula R0 = ρ(FV −1), where ρ(A) denotes
the spectral radius of the matrix A. A comment on the applicability of the results in [40] is given in
Remark A.1 below.
Since X∗ is a DFE, we may assume that X∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1 − p, p), for some p ∈ [0, 1]
representing the portion of population that is initially in the compartment Sr, while the remaining
1 − p fraction of the population is in Sf . Thus, in our setting, the matrices F and V related to the
dynamics (6) are given by
F =


0 0 β(1− p) rβ(1− p) β(1− p) rβ(1− p) 0
0 0 rβp r2βp rβp r2βp 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 σα 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 σα 0 0 0
0 0 σ(1 − α) + ρ σ(1 − α) + ρ ρ ρ 0


,
V =


ρδ + τ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ρδ + τ 0 0 0 0 0
−τ 0 σ + ρ 0 0 0 0
0 −τ 0 σ + ρ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 ρ+ γ1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ρ+ γ1 0
−ρδ −ρδ 0 0 0 0 γ2 + µ


.
Since V is non-singular, we compute
V −1 =


(ρδ+τ)−1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 (ρδ+τ)−1 0 0 0 0 0
τ
(σ+ρ)(ρδ+τ)
0 (σ+ρ)−1 0 0 0 0
0 τ
(σ+ρ)(ρδ+τ)
0 (σ+ρ)−1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 (ρ+γ1)−1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 (ρ+γ1)−1 0
ρδ
(γ2+µ)(ρδ+τ)
ρδ
(γ2+µ)(ρδ+τ)
0 0 0 0 (γ2+µ)−1


.
Thus, one can easily compute the matrix FV −1 and check that its characteristic polynomial is given
by
p(λ) = −λ5P2(λ) ,
where P2(λ) is a second order polynomial of the form
P2(λ) = λ
2 − βτ(1− p+ r
2p)
(ρδ + τ)(σ + ρ)
λ− σατβ(1 − p+ r
2p)
(ρ+ σ)(ρδ + τ)(ρ+ γ1)
.
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P2(λ) has one positive and one negative root, given by
λ1/2 =
1
2
(
βτ(1− p+ r2p)
(ρδ + τ)(σ + ρ)
±
√
∆
)
,
with
∆ =
(
βτ(1 − p+ r2p)
(ρδ + τ)(σ + ρ)
)2
+
4σατβ(1 − p+ r2p)
(ρ+ σ)(ρδ + τ)(ρ+ γ1)
> 0 .
Since the term βτ(1−p+r
2p)
(ρδ+τ)(σ+ρ) is positive, the value of R0 coincides with λ1, i.e.,
R0 = λ1 = 1
2
(
βτ(1− p+ r2p)
(ρδ + τ)(σ + ρ)
+
√
∆
)
. (7)
This is an analytic expression of R0, which shows its explicit dependence on the different parameters
of model (1). Proposition 3.1 gives a convenient equivalent condition to ensure the stability of DFE.
Remark A.1 In order to directly apply the results in [40], it is required that the eigenvalues of
Df(X∗) have negative values and, under this assumption, the asymptotic stability of the DFE is
established. In our case, the matrix Df(X∗) has zero as an eigenvalue of double multiplicity, with
associated eigenvectors in the directions of the last two variables, these being Sf and Sr. It is not
hard to see that the results in [40] hold for our system by simply modifying asymptotic stability to
stability in the directions of the susceptible compartments, which has no consequence in the meaning
of the threshold R0. Alternatively, a way to force the system to comply all the technical assumptions
from [40] is adding birth and natural mortality to our model, which has no relevant impact in the
results we showed (since the natural daily birth/death rates are of the order of 10−5, hence negligible
w.r.t. the other parameters).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
We remind that Proposition 3.1 claims the following: for
ϕ =
βτ [1 − (1− r2)p]
(ρδ + τ)(σ + ρ)
and T0 = ϕ
(
1 +
σα
ρ+ γ1
)
,
R0 is smaller than (respectively, equal to or greater than) 1 if and only if the same relation holds for
T0. Indeed, by a straightforward computation we realize that
R0 ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ ϕ+
√
ϕ2 +
4σα
ρ+ γ1
ϕ ≤ 2
⇐⇒ (0 <)
√
ϕ2 +
4σα
ρ+ γ1
ϕ ≤ 2− ϕ ∗⇐⇒ ϕ2 + 4σα
ρ+ γ1
ϕ ≤ (2− ϕ)2
⇐⇒ 4σα
ρ+ γ1
ϕ ≤ 4− 4ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ
(
1 +
σα
ρ+ γ1
)
≤ 1 ⇐⇒ T0 ≤ 1 .
Observe that the implication ⇐= in the equivalence ∗⇐⇒ holds true because
T0 ≤ 1 =⇒ ϕ ≤ ρ+ γ1
ρ+ γ1 + σα
≤ 1 ,
thus |2 − ϕ| = 2 − ϕ. In particular, the same chain of relations holds with the equal sign. Finally,
since R0 ≤ 1 is equivalent to T0 ≤ 1, then also R0 > 1 is equivalent to T0 > 1.
In addition, let us notice that, if ϕ > 1, then both R0 > 1 and T0 > 1. Indeed, from the definition
of T0, since σαρ+γ1 ≥ 0, we have that T0 ≥ ϕ > 1, and thus also R0 > 1.
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A.3 Sensitivity analysis of the threshold T0
The explicit representation (7) of the basic reproduction number R0 allows to study the sensitivity
of R0 with respect to the several parameters of the model (1). Moreover, thanks to Proposition 3.1,
we know that the threshold
T0 = βτ [1− (1− r
2)p]
(ρδ + τ)(σ + ρ)
(
1 +
σα
ρ+ γ1
)
can be used for an equivalent characterization of the condition R0 < 1. For this reason, it is
handier to develop the sensitivity of T0 with respect to the parameters of the model, and deduce its
dependence on perturbations of the parameters. We thus compute the normalized sensitivity index
Sx corresponding to the x parameter, given by
Sx :=
x
T0
∂T0
∂x
,
and we get that
Sβ = 1 > 0 ,
Sτ =
ρδ
ρδ + τ
> 0 ,
Sp = − (1− r
2)p
1− (1− r2)p < 0 ,
Sr =
2r2p
1− (1− r2)p > 0 ,
Sδ = − ρδ
ρδ + τ
< 0 ,
Sα =
σα
ρ+ γ1 + σα
> 0 ,
Sγ1 = −
σαγ1
(ρ+ γ1)(ρ+ γ1 + σα)
< 0 ,
Sσ = − σ[γ1 + (1− α)ρ]
(σ + ρ)(ρ+ γ1 + σα)
< 0 ,
Sρ = − ρ
ρ+ γ1 + σα
[
[δ(σ + 2ρ) + τ ](ρ+ γ1 + σα)
(ρδ + τ)(σ + ρ)
+
σα
ρ+ γ1
]
< 0 .
We thus notice the same qualitative dependence on the parameters already observed in Section 3.
In particular, if we increase k times the parameter β, then T0 increases k times as well. Similar
deductions can be made on the other parameters, with the corresponding coefficients obtained by
inserting the values of the parameters from Table 5. Moreover, from the expression of Sτ we realize
that, if either ρ or δ equal zero, then T0 does not depend on τ (as it happens for R0 as well, as
noticed in Remark 3.2). Similarly, if ρ = 0, then Sδ = 0, thus T0 does not depend on δ. Regarding
the parameters p and r, their dependence is mutually related as follows: if p = 0, then T0 does not
depend on r (since Sr = 0), whereas if r = 1 then T0 does not depend on p.
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